BOOK REVIEWS
Interpretations of Modem Legal Philosophies. Edited by Paul Sayre. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1947. Pp. ix, 807. $12.50.
This collection of studies was prepared as a tribute to Professor Roscoe Pound on
the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday on October 27, 1945. The volume was delayed because of war difficulties, and it is now presented to him as an international
honour which takes on further significance with the announcement that he will retire
from the Faculty of Law in Harvard University on June 30 of this year, with the title
of Professor Emeritus. Thus this long active career closes, and we join with all his
world-wide friends and admirers in the ancient liturgical wish-ad multos annos. He
can indeed know that "at evening time it shall be light."
The distinguished editor, Professor Paul Sayre, deserves warm congratulations, and
it is well that they should be given without reserve. It too frequently happens that the
editor of such a volume as this is lost amid his writers and that his difficult and exacting task is obscured. Professor Sayre has carried out his work with the greatest care
and scholarship. He has brought to it the finest skills, and it is a pleasure to read a book
so accurate in its references and so free from vain repetitions. Our only criticism is that
we sorely miss a comprehensive analytical index, which would have added greatly to
the value of the book. It is unfortunate that this is wanting, and for ourselves we have
tried to compile a rough and ready one, to assist in those references to the studies which
many will continue to demand. Professor Sayre has succeeded in gathering together a
group of thirty-six contributors, outstanding in their own right. Drawn from all over
the world (Canada excepted) they have presented, as a group, a fine view of the
philosophical side of the law; as the editor points out, they have thus made available
to the profession and to all those concerned with these significant modem activities, in
a convenient form nowhere else available, studies "which cover with amazing completeness the legal philosophies of the world today." The editor himself contributes a charming intimate introduction, which sets Pound so before us, that those of us who know
him will welcome a vignette which is excellent. Here we find something of his trainingfrom which we may learn a good deal more about education, legal or prelegal, than may
be found in much of the battle of the schools; something of his exacting scholarship;
something of his countless intellectual and public activities; something of his urbane
humanity; something of his philosophical growth; something of that totality of personality which has called forth the devoted and indeed affectionate honour to which
this volume will continue to bear witness.
It is impossible for any reviewer to review in detail a work of this nature; and anyone who attempted it would at once write himself down as either a fool or incompetent-perhaps both. At any rate, in accepting the honour of being invited to review it,
I entered an unqualified caveat that I could and would attempt nothing more than a
broad general view. Indeed, this is all the more necessary because, as is the case here,
only two or three of the studies deal with Pound's characteristic work, and there is no
grouping under any classification of subject-matters, as was the case with the recueil

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

d'etdes presented to Edouard Lambert in 1938--one of the most outstanding collections of its kind. These difficulties do not disqualify us from saying that Professor
Sayre's collection is more than worthy to stand beside the volumes which'paid honour
to Lambert.
Pound stands in a class by himself.. His scholarship is amazing, as the long record
of his learned publications discloses; and they stretch far beyond those listed in Mr.
F. C. Setaro's bibliographical volume, up to July 1940. He has brought to all this an
extraordinary width of legal learning, great practical and administrative experience,
and juristic insight of the first order, which have made his an outstanding seminal
mind. Running through all this is his exposition of law as a scheme of social engineering.
Others may find delight and perhaps profit in seeking the possible sources which lie behind this philosophy and in examining the difficulties of its application; for ourselves
the main interest at the moment is that he has made the profession sit up and listen.
Professor Kocourek has given us a study from the point of view of a former colleague,
but he has included in it Wigmore's description of the sheer consternation and alarm
which Pound produced when he addressed the American Bar Association in 19o6. It is
almost impossible to believe that Wigmore records an event less than half a century
old, which may well be taken as Pound's Archimedes' place where he stood and moved
the legal world-and it needed and still needs moving. He has done more directly,
and indirectly, to disclose how barren have been historical and analytical jurisprudences, whether as specifically taught, or as explicably or implicitly informing teaching
and practice. They tore the law away from life and society, fortified it as a mystic cult
living on its own fat and deriving its ideals and philosophies from contemplating its
own navel. To all this Pound has continued to throw down his challenge. He was the
first, as Professor Sayre says, who successfully tried to persuade both faculties of law
and the practicing lawyers to think of law not in terms of patterns of legal rules, but in
terms of the ways of living of actual human beings. He deliberately cut law away from
its water-logged anchorage of systematic perfection, and called on it to launch out into
the deep and let down its nets to catch a great harvest from the sea of human wants
and human interests-in a word to become notmerely the essential condition of organized living but the fertile assistant of all other activities aiming at similar needs. All
this is well known, but we scarcely realize until we deliberate how profound has been
his influence-from that scene to which Wigmore has bourne witness, as well as from
the challenge which he threw down to the faculties of law as long ago as 19o07: "Legal
monks who pass their lives in an atmosphere of pure law, from which every worldly
and human element is excluded, cannot shape practical principles to be applied to a
restless world of flesh and blood." He has revolutionised the teaching of law and thus
fertilized its practice. Law is an imperative but an imperative in an eternal conditional
mood, and it must be studied amid the clash of intellectual interests in a university
and not in a "trade-school." This is one of the greatest accomplishments of his career;
and far outside the United States it has given a great human increase. There is one
point here which may well give us thought. I ask a question without suggesting an
answer: Is there not a growing danger that our faculties of law are beginning to drift
from these fine incentives and surrender too much to the demands of mere technicalities? However that may be, I can at least join gladly in this world-wide tribute; and I
only hope that Pound will be spared to give us that systematic and long-looked-for
exposition of his philosophy which his scattered writings emphatically demand.

BOOK REVIEWS
Res est magni laboris.After this long excursus, I must say something of the volume
itself. I have already recorded my caveat. Carefully guarding it, I may say that here is
a irslange (in the traditional sense of that word) which is an intellectual treasure
house-rich in its variety and rich in its entirety. Each study would suggest a review.
I began it with the editor's introduction (I have learned that introductions should be
read), with Kocourek's contribution, and I then turned to the discussion of Pound's
theory of social interests by Professor Patterson, the distinguished Cardozo Professor
of Jurisprudence in Columbia University, which is the best short exposition of this
aspect of Pound's career with which I am acquainted. For all the studies, the rule of
alphabetical precedence has been followed, as did Pound when he edited, in i934, the
legal essays in honour of Beale and Williston. The wisdom of his rule suggests an equal
wisdom on my part. To select any of them for specific reference might be perhaps
invidious; worse still, it might disclose (and that would be easy enough to do) the vast
limitations on my own reading, interests, and thinking. 1 must confess that some of the
studies I do not understand, either through my own incapacity to grasp the ideas
which they may contain or through an inability to follow certain peculiar methods of
expression with which I am not familiar. Sometimes I got lost, completely lost, in an
empyrean of words, vague at least to me. Doubtless all this is my own misfortune, and
doubtless others will find it all full of meaning. However, the book as a whole is eminently human, eminently suggestive, eminently challenging. It is worthy of Pound;
and I can give it no higher praise.
In conclusion, certain thoughts suggest themselves. As I look back half a century ago
to the beginnings of my own legal education and to law as I long knew it, it is nothing
less than amazing to be brought up, dead on as it were, with the progress that has been
made. This progress is here a little and there a little, and no single essay in this book
answers all the questions, but the cumulative effect is a rich experience, which will bear
its finest fruit if the book is carefully and thoroughly read. No practising lawyer,
worthy of a professional name, can afford to neglect it. He will find in it food for
endless thought; and he will find in it a catechism which will search his very soul for
answers. For the faculties of law, the book is of vital importance. A taught law, without and apart from philosophy, may be "tough" as Maitland said,--but toughness is
only of value in gangsterdom. Without philosophy, a faculty of law may produce
technicians, tradesmen, office-men, businessmen, big executives, but it certainly will
ilot produce legal statesmen; and it is a tragic platitude to say that never before in the
history of the world was legal teaching called on to meet a more insistent human
demand to train such men. We shall not answer those challenges with a law hammered
out on the anvil of a mere cult's analysis, inbred and feeble with inbreeding; and we
shall not begin to talk sense about illegal practice of the law or about administrative
law and boards and such like, until we ask ourselves how far we are responsible for the
consuming public's obvious and increasing neglect of our mystic wares. Here, at any
rate, is a book which discloses a great ferment of creative purpose-law and philosophy
have joined hands. Pound is the great minister at the wedding, and it is our duty to see
that they may never be put asunder.
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